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DIRTY	CASH	(MONEY	TALKS):	
4AMLD	AND	THE	MONEY	LAUNDERING	REGULATIONS	2017	
	
Professor	Liz	Campbell,	Durham	University		
	
	
Abstract	
	
Addressing	 the	 laundering	of	money	 is	a	key	policing	and	policy	priority,	domestically	and	
internationally.	 The	 European	 Union’s	 Fourth	 Anti-Money	 Laundering	 Directive	 was	
transposed	 into	 domestic	 law	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 June	 2017,	 through	 the	 Money	 Laundering,	
Terrorist	Financing	and	Transfer	of	Funds	(Information	on	the	Payer)	Regulations	2017.	This	
article	 is	 a	 socio-legal	 critique	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 changes	 brought	 about	 by	 these	
Regulations.	 It	 synthesises	 and	 analyses	 a	 number	 of	 dimensions	 of	 the	 Regulations,	
structured	around	 the	central	 themes	of	 risk	and	 transparency.	By	 framing	 the	critique	 in	
this	way,	this	article	not	only	challenges	conventional	views	as	to	the	necessity	and	benefits	
of	 the	 anti-money	 laundering	 regime	 but	 also	 provides	 scholars	 and	 policymakers	 with	
specific	analyses	which	assist	in	justifying	its	existing	nature	and	form.		
	
	
1. Introduction			
	
Addressing	 the	 laundering	 of	 money	 has	 been	 a	 key	 policing	 and	 policy	 priority	 at	 the	
domestic	 and	 international	 level	 for	 decades.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 a	 global	 anti-money	
laundering	 (AML)	 regime	 has	 been	 developed,	 incorporating	 what	 is	 now	 an	 extensive	
compliance	industry,	in	an	effort	to	preserve	the	integrity	and	stability	of	the	economy	from	
money	 obtained	 through	 illicit	 means.1	 Money	 laundering,	 that	 is	 the	 cleaning	 or	
legitimising	of	“dirty”	criminal	money,2	is	an	“enabling	activity”	of	and	for	organised	crime,3	
as	well	as	being	“related	to	grand	corruption	overseas	–	bribery	and	theft	of	public	funds”.4	
Moreover,	allowing	“criminals	to	hide,	store	and	benefit	from	the	proceeds	of	their	crime”	is	
seen	as	compromising	the	 integrity	of	 financial	 institutions	and	markets5	and	as	distorting	
the	economy.6	Indeed,	the	United	Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime	estimates	that	two	to	
five	per	cent	of	global	GDP	(that	is,	$800	billion	to	$2	trillion)	is	laundered,7	though	this,	of	
course,	is	a	rather	broad	range.	
																																																						
1	HM	Treasury	and	Home	Office,	UK	national	risk	assessment	of	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	
(2015)	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/468210/UK_NRA_October_
2015_final_web.pdf	p3	
2		P.	Van	Duyne	“Money	Laundering	Policy:	Fears	and	Facts”,	in	P.	van	Duyne,	K.	von	Lampe	and	J.	Newell	(eds.)	
Criminal	Finances	and	Organizing	Crime	in	Europe	(Wolf	Legal	Publishers,	2003)	67,	69.	
3	Home	Office,	Action	Plan	for	anti-money	laundering	and	counter-terrorist	finance	(Home	Office,	2016)	1.1,	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/517992/6-2118-
Action_Plan_for_Anti-Money_Laundering__web_.pdf;	HM	Treasury	and	Home	Office,	UK	national	risk	
assessment	p.3.	
4	Home	Office,	Action	Plan,	1.2.	
5	ibid.		
6	see	V.	Tanzi,	“Macroeconomic	Implications	of	Money	Laundering”	in	E.	Savona	(ed.)	Responding	to	Money	
Laundering,	International	Perspectives	(Routledge,	2000)	91.	
7	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money-laundering/globalization.html		
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There	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 concerning	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 money	 laundering,	
rendering	it	difficult	to	study	and	to	assess	its	scale.	Legally	the	term	encompasses	not	only	
the	 orthodox	 understanding	 of	 the	 “cleaning”	 of	 assets,	 but	 also	 their	 concealment,	
conversion,	 transfer	 and	 removal.8	 Despite,	 or	 perhaps	 because	 of,	 these	 definitional	
ambiguities,	 it	 is	 fair	 to	 say	 that	money	 laundering	 has	 become	 “one	 of	 the	 great	moral	
panics	of	our	day”9,	and	that	there	is	a	“crusade”	against	it.10	This	campaign	has	taken	the	
form	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 a	 complex	 framework	 of	 AML	 laws	 and	 policies,	 as	 well	 as	
uniformly	 supportive	political	 rhetoric.	 The	 scheme	comprises	a	 range	of	 (trans/)	national	
legislation,	 regulations	 and	policies,	 binding	 and	otherwise,	 and	 relies	 on	both	public	 and	
private	actors	and	institutions.	It	involves	prohibitory	and	preventive	dimensions,	insofar	as	
it	criminalises	money	laundering	as	well	as	imposing	numerous	obligations	to	guard	against	
and	detect	such	behaviour.11	Some	of	these	provisions	are	mandatory	or	absolute	in	nature,	
whereas	others	encompass	an	assessment	of	risk	and	associated	calibration	of	practice.12	In	
substance,	these	standards	derive	from	the	Recommendations	of	the	Financial	Action	Task	
Force	 (FATF),	 an	 inter-governmental,	 policy-making	body	 established	 in	 1989,13	which	 are	
echoed	 in	 a	 series	 of	 Anti-Money	 Laundering	 Directives	 from	 the	 European	 Union,	
ultimately	transposed	through	domestic	legislation.		
	
The	 Regulations	 are	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 AML	 regulatory	 landscape	 in	 the	 UK,	 which,	 as	 is	
explored	below,	relies	heavily	on	private	actors,	and	includes	the	creation	of	bodies	like	the	
Joint	 Money	 Laundering	 Steering	 Group	 (JMLSG)	 and	 the	 Joint	 Money	 Laundering	
Intelligence	 Taskforce	 (JMLIT).	 JMLSG	 comprises	 trade	 associations	 from	 the	 financial	
services	 industry	specifically,	and	it	 issues	guidance	which	is	taken	into	account	by	a	court	
when	considering	whether	a	person	 in	 the	 sector	has	 committed	 the	offence	of	 failing	 to	
report	money	 laundering.14	Moreover,	 in	2014	 the	National	Crime	Agency	established	 the	
Joint	 Money	 Laundering	 Intelligence	 Taskforce	 (JMLIT)	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	 financial	
sector,	government,	 the	British	Bankers	Association	and	 law	enforcement,	 to	combat	high	
end	money	laundering.		
	
In	terms	of	AML	rules,	the	FATF’s	most	recent	Recommendations	of	2012	sought,	inter	alia,	
to	take	account	of	new	technologies	and	sectors,	which	present	new	vulnerabilities	to	and	
new	mechanisms	for	the	laundering	of	money.	These	Recommendations	are	mirrored	in	the	
European	Union’s	Fourth	Anti-Money	Laundering	Directive	(4AMLD),	adopted	by	the	EU	in	
May	2015.	4AMLD	both	extends	and	refines	 the	extant	AML	scheme,	and	was	transposed	
																																																						
8	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002	s.327.		
9	P.	Alldridge,	“Money	Laundering	and	Globalization”	(2008)	35	(4)	Journal	of	Law	and	Society	437.		
10	P.	Alldridge,	“The	Moral	Limits	of	the	Crime	of	Money	Laundering”	(2001)	5	Buffalo	Criminal	Law	Review	
279-319,	282.	
11	Alldridge,	“Money	Laundering	and	Globalization”,	442.	
12	See	M.	van	den	Broek	“The	EU’s	preventive	AML/CFT	policy:	asymmetrical	harmonization”	(2011)	14	Journal	
of	Money	Laundering	Control	170-182.	
13	 International	 Standards	 on	 Combating	Money	 Laundering	 and	 the	 Financing	 of	 Terrorism	&	 Proliferation	
(FATF	Recommendations),	published		in	February	2012:	http://www.fatf-gafi.org.	The	FATF	Recommendations	
were	 issued	first	 in	1990,	and	then	revised	 in	1996,	2001,	2003	and	2012.	 In	addition,	the	FATF	monitors	 its	
members’	implementation	and	operation	of	AML	measures,	as	well	as	vulnerabilities	to	money	laundering.			
14	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002	ss.330	and	331.		
		 3	
into	 domestic	 law	 by	 the	 Money	 Laundering,	 Terrorist	 Financing	 and	 Transfer	 of	 Funds	
(Information	on	the	Payer)	Regulations	2017	(Money	Laundering	Regulations	2017).	
	
In	this	article	I	present	the	first	contextualised,	socio-legal	critique	of	the	most	noteworthy	
changes	brought	 about	by	 the	Money	 Laundering	Regulations	2017	 (MLR	2017)	 and	 their	
interplay	with	existing	 law.	 This	 article	 is	 significant	 in	 that	what	 commentary	 there	 is	 on	
4AMLD	and	the	MLR	2017	is	strictly	doctrinal	 in	focus.	Though	that	 is	useful	 in	a	technical	
and	practical	sense,	here	I	offer	further	conceptual	exploration	and	normative	conclusions.	
This	 article	 synthesises	 and	 subsequently	 analyses	 a	 number	 of	 dimensions	 of	 the	 MLR	
2017,	 structured	 around	 the	 central	 themes	 of	 risk	 and	 transparency.15	 By	 framing	 the	
critique	in	this	way,	this	article	not	only	challenges	conventional	views	as	to	the	benefits	and	
necessity	of	AML	but	also	provides	scholars	and	policymakers	with	specific	analyses	which	
assist	 in	whether	 the	 existing	 nature	 and	 form	 of	 AML	measures	 can	 be	 justified.	 This	 is	
crucial,	not	 least	given	 that	 further	change	 is	on	 the	horizon	with	 the	so-called	Fifth	Anti-
Money	Laundering	Directive	(5AMLD).	
	
After	setting	out	the	role	and	effect	of	the	European	Union	Money	Laundering	Directives,	I	
examine	 a	 number	 of	 different	 components	 of	 the	 2017	 Regulations,	 centring	 on	 the	
concepts	of	risk	and	transparency.	The	article	does	not	purport	to	be	fully	comprehensive	in	
its	coverage	of	the	Regulations,	rather	its	focus	is	on	the	two	themes.	In	terms	of	risk,	some	
changes	have	been	made	to	the	bodies	to	which	the	Regulations	apply;	the	process	of	risk	
assessment;	 and	 the	 requirements	 of	 due	 diligence.	 I	 consider	 how	 private	 entities	 are	
circumventing	and	confounding	the	risk-based	approach,	and	reflect	on	the	implications	of	
this.	 In	 addition,	 to	 improve	 transparency,	 4AMLD	 requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 two	
registers,	 one	 for	 corporate	 bodies,	 the	 other	 for	 trusts.	 	 I	 assess	 how	 these	 have	 been	
implemented	 in	domestic	 law	and	highlight	 future	potential	 changes.	 Finally,	 I	 raise	 three	
critical	objections	to	the	2017	Regulations,	and	the	AML	framework	more	broadly,	centring	
on	effectiveness,	human	rights,	and	unintended	consequences.		
	
	
2. The	European	Union	Money	Laundering	Directives	
	
The	European	Union	is	the	critical	driver	of	AML	in	the	UK,	given	that	its	money	laundering	
Directives	 must	 be	 transposed	 into	 the	 domestic	 law	 of	 all	 member	 states.	 The	 latest	
Directive,	the	Fourth	Anti-Money	Laundering	Directive	2015/849	(4AMLD),	was	adopted	by	
the	European	Parliament	on	20	May	2015,	and	reflects	the	revised	FATF	recommendations	
of	 2012.	 As	 discussed	 below,	 4AMLD	 requires	 a	 stricter	 approach	 to	 AML	 than	 its	
predecessors,	insofar	as	it	is	more	extensive	and	more	onerous,	though	also	more	nuanced	
in	some	respects.	4AMLD	repeals	and	replaces	 the	Third	Anti-Money	Laundering	Directive	
2005/60/EC	(3AMLD),	which	had	been	transposed	in	the	UK	through	the	Proceeds	of	Crime	
Act	2002,	the	Terrorism	Act	2000	and	the	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007	(MLR	2007).	
While	there	is	some	reference	in	the	media	and	political	discourse	to	the	“Fifth”	Anti-Money	
Laundering	 Directive	 (5AMLD)	 in	 fact	 this	 is	 a	 set	 of	 proposed	 amendments	 to	 4AMLD,	
																																																						
15	I	do	not	examine	the	counter-terrorist	financing	elements	of	the	Regulations.	See	M.	Levi,	“Combating	the	
financing	of	terrorism:	a	history	and	assessment	of	the	control	of	'threat	finance”	(2010)	50	British	Journal	of	
Criminology	650-669.	
		 4	
published	on	5	July	2016	by	the	European	Commission,16	and	currently	being	negotiated	in	
the	European	Parliament.	This	revisiting	was	prompted	by	a	number	of	terrorist	attacks	 in	
Europe	as	well	as	 the	“Panama	Papers”,17	and	seeks	 to	 take	 into	account	new	means	and	
modalities	 of	 transferring	 funds.	 So,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 AML	 terrain	 is	 shifting,	 and	
expanding.		
	
Notwithstanding	the	vote	 to	 leave	the	European	Union	 in	 June	2016	and	the	triggering	of	
Article	50	in	Match	2017,	for	the	time	being	the	UK	remains	a	full	member	and	will	continue	
to	 implement	 and	 apply	 EU	 legislation.	 Even	 without	 the	 transposition	 of	 EU	 law	 as	 a	
condition	of	membership,	it	is	likely	that	the	UK	would	enact	and	adhere	to	the	policy	aims	
behind	the	Directive	as	steered	by	FATF,	given	that	to	do	otherwise	would	compromise	the	
UK’s	reputation	and	compliance	in	this	context.	The	FATF	will	be	evaluating	AML	in	the	UK	in	
October	 2018;	 the	 last	 evaluation	 was	 in	 2007	 where	 after	 follow-up	 action	 the	 UK	 was	
deemed	 to	 be	 “largely	 compliant”	 with	 FATF	 standards.18	 Maintenance	 of	 this	 status,	
regardless	of	EU	membership,	will	remain	a	priority.			
	
	
3. The	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2017		
	
4AMLD	was	enacted	in	the	UK	by	means	of	the	Money	Laundering,	Terrorist	Financing	and	
Transfer	of	Funds	(Information	on	the	Payer)	Regulations	2017	(MLR	2017),	which	came	into	
force	 on	 26	 June	 2017.	 Like	 their	 precursors,	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 implement	 the	 main	
preventative	 measures	 of	 the	 relevant	 EU	 Directive,	 by	 requiring	 “obliged	 entities”19	 or	
“relevant	 persons”20	 in	 the	 financial	 sector	 and	 beyond	 to	 apply	 customer	 due	 diligence	
measures	and	take	other	steps	to	prevent	their	services	being	used	for	money	laundering.	
	
There	 is	 a	 deliberate	 degree	 of	 latitude	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 legislative	 transposition	 of	
4AMLD	as	well	as	the	practical	implementation	of	the	MLR	2017.	As	is	outlined	below,	while	
some	articles	in	4AMLD	are	mandatory,	others	leave	discretion	to	member	states	as	to	how	
they	 will	 enact	 the	 measures,	 in	 permitting	 the	 exemption	 of	 certain	 sectors	 from	 AML	
obligations,	for	instance.	Moreover,	both	4AMLD	and	the	Regulations	generally	are	framed	
in	 terms	 of	 objectives,	with	 little	 to	 no	 prescription	 or	 elaboration	 as	 to	 how	 these	 aims	
must	 be	 met	 by	 the	 particular	 entity.	 This	 guarantees	 some	 discretion	 for	 businesses	 in	
interpretation	 and	 implementation.	Overall,	 the	 Regulations	 seek	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	UK’s	
AML	regime	is	both	effective	and	proportionate.21	I	question	the	realisation	of	both	of	these	
aims.		
																																																						
16	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	amending	
Directive	(EU)	2015/849	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purposes	of	money	
laundering	or	terrorist	financing	and	amending	Directive	2009/101/EC,	COM(2016)	450	final	2016/0208	(COD),	
5	July	2016,	http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/document/files/aml-directive_en.pdf		
17	https://panamapapers.icij.org		
18	FATF,	Fourth	Follow-Up	Report:	United	Kingdom	(FATF,	2009):	http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/FoR%20UK.pdf		
19	4AMLD,	Article	2.	
20	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2017.	I	use	the	terms	interchangeably.		
21	HM	Treasury,	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2017:	consultation	(HM	Treasury,	2017)	
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/money-laundering-regulations-2017/money-laundering-
regulations-2017	p1.	
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The	 system	 of	 money	 laundering	 controls	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	 “weak	 conceptual	
foundations”.22	Regardless,	a	lack	of	foundational	principles	has	not	stymied	its	continuance	
and	 expansion.	 While	 a	 risk-based	 approach	 was	 central	 to	 3AMLD,	 it	 is	 even	 more	
important	and	further	disaggregated	now.	Transparency	is	also	emphasised	in	4AMLD.	I	now	
consider	these	two	themes,	and	their	manifestation	in	the	2017	Regulations,	in	turn.		
	
a. Risk		
	
4AMLD,	 like	 its	 predecessor,	 imposes	 obligations	 on	 certain	 business	 entities	 to	 establish	
policies	and	procedures	to	prevent	money	laundering.	The	current	regime	is	predicated	on	
the	management	of	the	risk,	through	its	ascertainment	by	means	of	risk	assessments,	and	
then	 the	 subsequent	 shaping	 of	 the	 required	 customer	 due	 diligence	 measures.23	 A	
“relevant	 person”,	 as	 explored	 below,	 must	 establish	 adequate	 and	 appropriate	 policies,	
controls	and	procedures	 to	prevent	money	 laundering,24	proportionate	with	regard	to	the	
size	 and	nature	of	 its	 business.25	 It	must	 “regularly	 review	and	update”	 such	policies	 and	
controls,	 and	maintain	 a	written	 record	 of	 any	 changes	made	 following	 review	 and	 steps	
taken	to	communicate	the	changes	to	staff.26	Failure	to	comply	with	these	obligations	risks	a	
prison	 term	 of	 up	 to	 two	 years	 and/or	 a	 fine,27	 and	 individual	 and	 corporate	 liability	 is	
provided	for.28	
	
Under	 the	 separate,	 pre-existing	 legal	 framework,	 entities	 must	 identify	 and	 report	
suspicious	 transactions	 to	 the	United	 Kingdom	 Financial	 Intelligence	Unit,	 in	 the	National	
Crime	 Agency,	 by	 means	 of	 “suspicious	 activity	 reports”	 (SARs).29	 Peter	 Alldridge’s	
observation	 that	 these	policies	 induce	 “defensive	over-reporting”30	 holds	 true,	 and	 this	 is	
exacerbated	 by	 the	 increased	 obligations	 and	 reporting	 requirements	 under	 4AMLD.	 The	
danger	of	 imposing	criminal	sanctions	 in	this	context	 is	over-recording	and	over-reporting,	
meaning	 Governments	 (and	 private	 entities)	 are	 “drowned	 in	 data”,31	 with	 debatable	
benefit.	
	
i. “Obliged	entities”		
	
Globally,	 AML	 hinges	 on	 the	 contribution	 of	 private	 bodies,	 firms	 and	 professionals,	
described	in	4AMLD	as	“obliged	entities”.32	The	Home	Office	describes	the	private	sector	as	
																																																						
22	M.	Levi	and	P.	Reuter,	“Money	Laundering”	in	M.	Tonry	(ed.)	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Crime	and	Public	
Policy	(Oxford	University	Press:	2009)	356-380,	358.		
23	See	FATF	Recommendations	1	and	10;	S.	Ross	and	M.	Hannan	“Money	laundering	regulation	and	risk-based	
decision	making”	(2007)	10	Journal	of	Money	Laundering	Control	106-15.	
24	Regulation	19.	
25	Regulation	19(2).	
26	Regulation	19(1).	
27	Regulation	86.	
28	Regulation	92.	
29	Proceeds	of	Crime	Act	2002	s.338.		
30	Alldridge,	“Money	Laundering	and	Globalization”,	443.	
31	B.	Unger	and	F.	van	Waarden,	“How	to	Dodge	Drowning	in	Data?	Rule-	and	Risk-Based	Anti	Money	
Laundering	Policies	Compared”	(2009)	5	Review	of	Law	&	Economics	953-985.	
32	4AMLD	Article	2(1)(3).		
		 6	
“the	first	line	of	defence	against	money	laundering”,33	and	sees	a	stronger	partnership	with	
the	 private	 sector	 as	 one	 of	 its	 Action	 Plan’s	 four	 priorities.34	 The	 range	 of	 entities	 and	
sectors	encompassed	by	AML	requirements	has	been	steadily	expanding	from	the	financial	
sector	 only,	 as	 was	 the	 situation	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 first	 AML	 Council	 Directive	 of	
1991.35	 Now	 “obliged	 entities”	 or	 “relevant	 persons”	 are	 defined	 as	 credit	 and	 financial	
institutions;	 auditors,	 external	 accountants	 and	 tax	 advisors;	 notaries	 and	 other	
independent	 legal	 professionals,	 trust	 or	 company	 services	 providers;	 estate	 agents;	
persons	 trading	 in	 goods	 with	 cash	 payments	 of	 EUR10,000	 or	 more,	 and	 providers	 of	
gambling	services.36		
	
There	are	two	changes	of	note	here.	First,	the	cash	threshold	for	businesses	handling	high-
value	 goods	 has	 been	 lowered,	 down	 from	 EUR15,000	 in	 3AMLD.37	 Moreover,	 4AMLD	
extends	its	coverage	to	the	whole	gambling	sector,	offline	and	online,	whereas	only	holders	
of	 a	 casino	 operating	 licence	were	 subject	 previously.	 Though	 prima	 facie	 4AMLD	would	
apply	 to	 the	 entire	 gambling	 industry,	 it	 permits	 the	 exemption	 of	 providers	 of	 certain	
gambling	 services	 on	 the	 “basis	 of	 the	 proven	 low	 risk	 posed	 by	 the	 nature	 and,	 where	
appropriate,	the	scale	of	operations	of	such	services”.38	A	decision	has	been	taken	in	the	UK	
to	so	exempt	the	gambling	industry,39	apart	from	casinos,	thus	representing	a	maintenance	
of	 the	 status	 quo.	 This	 position	 will	 be	 kept	 under	 review,40	 and	 will	 form	 part	 of	 HM	
Treasury’s	ML	 risk	 assessment,	detailed	below.41	Despite	 the	 sector’s	diversity	 in	 types	of	
business,	in	addition	to	its	attraction	for	the	spending	of	criminal	proceeds,	the	Government	
was	convinced	by	mitigating	factors	such	as	strict	licence	conditions	and	the	role	and	robust	
approach	of	the	Gambling	Commission,42	and	its	classification	as	low	risk	in	relation	to	other	
regulated	 sectors.43	 Indeed,	 some	 sort	 of	 money	 laundering	 hierarchy	 seems	 to	 be	
recognised	by	the	Gambling	Commission,	which	noted	that	“a	significant	proportion	of	the	
money	laundering	that	takes	place	within	the	gambling	industry	is	by	criminals	spending	the	
proceeds	of	crime,	for	example,	for	gambling	purposes,	rather	than	the	traditional	‘washing’	
of	criminal	funds”.44	While	I	am	not	advocating	a	continued	extension	of	the	AML	regime,	it	
is	 still	 curious	 to	 see	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 exemption	 in	 this	 context	 which	 could	well	
apply	in	other	situations.		
	
The	other	development	in	the	2017	Regulations	in	respect	of	relevant	persons	concerns	the	
meaning	 of	 “business	 relationship”,	 which	 if	 established	means	 that	 the	 AML	 obligations	
																																																						
33	Home	Office,	Action	Plan,	2.1.	
34	Home	Office,	Action	Plan,	1.8.	The	other	priorities	are	enhancing	the	law	enforcement	response;	improving	
the	effectiveness	of	the	supervisory	regime;	and	increasing	international	reach.		
35	European	Union	(1991),	Council	Directive	91/308/EEC	of	10	June	1991	on	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	
financial	system	for	the	purpose	of	money	laundering.	
36	4AMLD	Article	2(1)(3);	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2017	Part	1.	
37	4AMLD	Article	2.	
38	4AMLD	Article	2(2).	
39	HM	Treasury,	Consultation.		
40	HM	Treasury,	Consultation,	section	4.	
41	Regulation	16(3)(c).	
42	HM	Treasury,	Consultation,	section	4.		
43	HM	Treasury	and	Home	Office,	UK	national	risk	assessment,	para	6.217.	
44	Gambling	Commission,	Money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	risk	within	the	British	gambling	industry	
(Gambling	Commission,	2016)	para	5.3:	http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/PDF/AML/Money-
laundering-and-terrorist-financing-risk-within-the-British-gambling-industry.pdf		
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apply.	These	changes	apply	to	estate	agents	and	trust	or	company	service	providers.	While	
estate	agents	were	already	covered	by	the	MLR	2007,	this	was	only	in	relation	to	the	party	
for	 which	 they	 were	 acting,	 usually	 the	 seller.	 Now	 an	 estate	 agent	 is	 to	 be	 treated	 as	
entering	into	a	business	relationship	with	a	purchaser	(as	well	as	with	a	seller),	at	the	point	
when	the	purchaser’s	offer	 is	accepted	by	the	seller.45	Moreover,	the	meaning	of	business	
relationship	 has	 been	 extended	 to	 include	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 company	 by	 a	 trust	 or	
company	 service	 provider,	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 formation	 is	 the	 only	 transaction	 being	
carried	out	for	that	customer.46	This	is	an	understandable	extension,	given	the	intensifying	
practitioner	and	academic	recognition	of	professional	facilitation	of	serious	crime.47		
	
Relevant	 persons	 are	 gatekeepers-turned-police,	 required	 to	 detect,	 monitor	 and	 report	
suspicions	of	money	 laundering,	but	are	 viewed	also	as	possible	 facilitators	or	enablers,48	
that	can	be	deterred	or	punished	through	criminalisation.	In	terms	of	their	policing	role,	on	
the	 one	 hand	 this	 could	 be	 regarded	 as	 the	 quintessential	 “responsibilisation”	 of	 private	
entities	in	the	policing	of	problematic	behaviour.49	This	involves	the	redefinition	of	the	role	
of	 the	state	 to	one	of	a	partner	or	 facilitator,	 “steering	and	regulating	 rather	 than	rowing	
and	 providing”.50	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 this	 might	 not	 constitute	 a	 reappraisal	 of	 the	
appropriate	role	of	the	state	per	se,	rather	a	concession	to	the	fact	that	private	entities	are	
those	with	adequate	access	and	data	in	this	context.	It	is	hard	to	conceive	of	how	the	state	
could	intervene	in	a	comparable	manner.	
	
Furthermore,	 the	cost	of	 this	 scheme	 to	 the	private	 sector	 is	 remarkable,	with	 the	British	
Bankers’	Association	estimating	that	its	members	spend	at	least	£5	billion	in	total	annually	
on	financial	crime	compliance,	including	enhanced	systems	and	controls	and	recruitment	of	
staff.51	Peter	Alldridge	rightly	notes	that	if	this	AML	policing	were	to	be	performed	directly	
at	the	taxpayers’	expense,	more	questions	would	be	raised	as	to	its	efficacy,	and	that	policy	
alternatives	 would	 be	 contemplated.52	 Regardless,	 these	 costs	 are	 transferred	 to	 and	
absorbed	by	customers.	
	
ii. Risk	assessment	and	monitoring		
	
HM	Treasury	and	Home	Office,	the	various	supervisory	bodies	of	the	regulated	sectors	(e.g.	
the	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority,	 the	 Law	 Society),53	 and	 the	 relevant	 businesses/persons	
must	carry	out	risk	assessments	under	the	MLR	2017.		
																																																						
45	Regulation	4(3).	
46	Regulation	4(2).	
47	Europol,	The	EU	Serious	and	Organised	Crime	Threat	Assessment	(Europol	2013)	1.5;	Home	Office,	Serious	
and	Organised	Crime	Strategy	(Cm	8715,	2013)	para	2.6.	
48	National	Crime	Agency,	National	Strategic	Assessment	of	Serious	and	Organised	Crime	2017	(National	Crime	
Agency,	2017)	p21.	
49	D.	Garland	The	Culture	of	Control	(Oxford	University	Press,	2001)	124.	
50	N.	Rose	“Government	and	Control”	(2000)	40	British	Journal	of	Criminology	321,	323-324.	
51	Home	Office,	Action	Plan,	2.1.	
52	Alldridge,	“Money	Laundering	and	Globalization”,	460.	
53	There	are	25	such	organisations,	22	of	which	are	professional	bodies	for	accountancy	and	legal	services.	The	
Government	proposed	in	March	2017	to	establish	an	Office	for	Professional	Body	Anti-Money	Laundering	
Supervision,	which	will	set	out	how	supervisors	should	comply	with	their	AML	obligations,	with	the	powers	to	
penalise	any	breaches	of	the	Regulations.	See	https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-tightens-defences-
against-money-laundering.	This	has	yet	to	occur.		
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HM	Treasury	and	the	Home	Office	must	undertake	a	risk	assessment	in	the	first	year	of	the	
Regulations,	to	identify,	assess,	understand	and	mitigate	the	risks	of	money	laundering	and	
terrorist	 financing	 affecting	 the	 United	 Kingdom,	 and	 must	 keep	 this	 updated.54	 The	
assessment	must,	 inter	alia,	 identify	 in	what	context	and	what	sort	of	enhanced	customer	
due	 diligence	measures	 should	 be	 applied;	 sectors	 or	 areas	 of	 lower	 and	 greater	 risk	 of	
money	 laundering;	 and	 consider	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 supervisory	 authority	 rules	 on	
money	laundering	in	the	light	of	the	risks.	
	
The	numerous	supervisory	authorities	of	the	regulated	sectors	must	identify	and	assess	the	
international	and	domestic	 risks	of	money	 laundering	 to	which	 those	relevant	persons	 for	
which	it	is	the	supervisory	authority	are	subject.55	Each	supervisory	authority	must	keep	an	
up-to-date	 written	 record	 of	 this,56	 and	 must	 develop	 and	 record	 risk	 profiles	 for	 each	
relevant	person	in	its	own	sector.57	It	also	must	effectively	monitor	its	own	sector	and	take	
necessary	measures	for	the	purpose	of	securing	compliance	with	the	Regulations,58	as	well	
as	providing	up-to-date	information	on	money	laundering	to	its	own	sector.59	A	supervisory	
authority	which	knows	or	 suspects,	or	has	 reasonable	grounds	 for	knowing	or	 suspecting,	
that	a	person	is	or	has	engaged	in	money	laundering	or	terrorist	financing	must	inform	the	
NCA	as	soon	as	practicable.60		
	
Regulation	 18	 governs	 the	 assessment	 of	 risk	 by	 “relevant	 persons”,	 requiring	 credit	
institutions;	 financial	 institutions;	 auditors,	 insolvency	 practitioners,	 external	 accountants	
and	 tax	 advisers;	 independent	 legal	 professionals;	 trust	 or	 company	 service	 providers;	
estate	agents;	high	value	dealers	and	casinos	to	carry	out	business	risk	assessments.	They	
must	identify	and	assess	the	risks	of	money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	to	which	their	
business	 is	 subject,	 taking	 into	 account	 information	 made	 available	 to	 them	 by	 their	
supervisory	authority,	and	risk	 factors	relating	to	their	customers,	countries	or	geographic	
areas	of	operations,	products,	services,	transactions	and	delivery	channels.	A	business	must	
provide	 this	 risk	assessment	and	the	 information	on	which	 it	was	based	to	 its	 supervisory	
authority	on	request.61	These	assessments	affect	the	degree	of	due	diligence	that	must	be	
carried	out.		
	
These	risk	assessment	processes,	though	not	arbitrary,	are	not	particularly	standardised	or	
categorised.	There	 is	no	calculation	of	 risk	 factors	based	on	an	equation	 like	probability	 x	
severity	 x	 detectability,	 as	 is	 the	 case	 in	 risk	 assessment	 in	 other	 sectors	 such	 as	 the	
pharmaceutical	 industry.62	 Indeed,	 the	 JMLSG	notes	 in	 its	guidance	 that	 firms	 that	do	not	
																																																						
54	Regulation	16.	
55	Regulation	17.	
56	Regulation	17(3).	
57	Regulation	17(4).	
58	Regulation	46(1).	
59	Regulation	47(1).	
60	Regulation	46(5).	
61	Regulation	18(6).	
62	See	International	Conference	on	Harmonisation	of	Technical	Requirements	for	Registration	of	
Pharmaceuticals	for	Human	Use	(2005)	
https://www.ich.org/fileadmin/Public_Web_Site/ICH_Products/Guidelines/Quality/Q9/Step4/Q9_Guideline.p
df	pp3-4.	
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offer	complex	products	or	services	and	that	have	limited	or	no	international	exposure	may	
not	need	an	“overly	complex”	risk	assessment.63		
	
Generally,	risk	is	couched	in	the	MLR	2017	in	terms	of	the	binary	of	high	or	low,	and	there	is	
no	 explanation	 or	 quantification	 of	 these.	 Rather	 it	 is	 left	 to	 supervisory	 authorities	 and	
relevant	persons	to	devise	the	standards	and	guidance.	The	only	reference	to	“medium	risk”	
is	to	be	found	in	Schedule	4	of	the	MLR	2017.64	A	relative	approach	to	risk	is	evident	in	the	
Preamble	 to	 4AMLD,	 which	 states	 that	 a	 “higher	 risk	 “of	 money	 laundering	 may	 justify	
enhanced	measures,	whereas	“a	reduced	risk”	may	justify	less	rigorous	controls	and	Annex	
III	to	4AMLD	provides	“a	non-exhaustive	list	of	factors	and	types	of	evidence	of	potentially	
higher	risk	referred	to	in	Article	18(3)”.	Of	course,	this	prompts	the	question	of	“higher	risk	
than/according	 to	what?”	The	 term	“reduced	 risk”	 is	not	adopted	 in	 the	Regulations,	and	
“lower”65	 and	 “higher”66	 risk	 are	 used	 just	 twice	 each,	 indicating	 some	 inconsistency	 in	
drafting	and	overlooking	the	possible	implication	of	these	terms.		
	
iii. Due	diligence		
	
The	 persons	 outlined	 above	 must	 apply	 different	 levels	 of	 due	 diligence	 measures	 to	
customers,	depending	the	nature	and	level	of	risk:	customer	due	diligence	(CDD),	simplified	
due	diligence	(SDD)	or	enhanced	due	diligence	(EDD).	The	rationale	is	that	this	process	will	
act	 as	 a	 deterrence	 to	 offending,	 and	 will	 deny	 offenders’	 access	 to	 financial	 and	 other	
services	 once	 their	 information	 has	 been	 checked	 and	 validated.67	 Firms	 must	 conduct	
ongoing	monitoring	of	the	business	relationship	with	their	customers.68	There	is	no	obliged	
reporting	of	due	diligence	and	monitoring	to	the	supervisory	authority.	
 
Relevant	 persons	must	 carry	 out	 CDD	where	 there	 is	 a	 suspicion	 of	money	 laundering	 or	
terrorist	financing,	and	in	the	case	of	trading	in	goods	with	cash	transactions	of	EUR	15,000	
or	more,	or	EUR	10,000	for	high-value	dealers.69	CDD	means	 identifying	the	customer	and	
verifying	her	 identity	on	the	basis	of	 reliable	 information;	 identifying	 the	beneficial	owner	
and	taking	reasonable	measures	to	verify	that	person’s	identity	so	that	the	relevant	person	
is	satisfied	that	it	knows	who	the	beneficial	owner	is,	including	taking	reasonable	measures	
to	 understand	 the	 ownership	 and	 control	 structure	 of	 legal	 persons,	 trusts,	 companies,	
foundations	 and	 similar	 legal	 arrangements;	 obtaining	 information	 on	 the	 purpose	 and	
intended	 nature	 of	 the	 business	 relationship;	 and	 continuing	 to	 monitor	 the	 business	
relationship	and	transactions	and	updating	documents,	data	or	information.70		
	
																																																						
63	JMLSG,	Prevention	of	money	laundering/	combating	terrorist	financing:	Guidance	for	the	UK	financial	sector	
Part	1	(JMLSG,	2017)	4.27.	
64	Schedule	4,	regulation	6.	
65	Regulations	16(2)(b)	and	37(3)(a).	
66	Regulations	21(7)(a)	and	33(1).	
67	M.	Levi,	“Money	for	Crime	and	Money	from	Crime:	Financing	crime	and	laundering	crime	proceeds”	(2015)	
21	European	Journal	on	Criminal	Policy	and	Research	275,	297.	
68	Regulation	28(11).	
69	4AMLD,	Article	11;	Regulations	14	and	27.		
70	Regulation	28.	
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Where	 a	 Member	 State	 or	 relevant	 person	 identifies	 “areas	 of	 lower	 risk”	 simplified	
customer	due	diligence	measures	may	be	applied.71	That	said,	the	simplified	customer	due	
diligence	(SDD)	process	has	been	amended	to	move	away	from	its	automatic	deployment,	
resulting	 in	 an	 increased	 onus	 on	 the	 relevant	 person.	 Now,	 SDD	 is	 allowed	 where	 the	
relevant	 person	 has	 established	 that	 the	 business	 relationship	 or	 transaction	 presents	 a	
lower	degree	of	money	laundering	risk,	taking	into	account	the	risk	assessment,	information	
from	the	sector’s	supervisory	authority,	and	risk	factors	relating	to	the	customer,	product,	
service,	 transaction,	 delivery	 channel	 or	 geographical	 location.72	 This	 differs	 from	 the	
previous	 position	 where	 the	 relevant	 person	 was	 not	 required	 to	 apply	 customer	 due	
diligence	in	specified	circumstances,	according	to	a	prescriptive	list	of	customer	type.73		
	
Where	higher	risks	are	identified,	relevant	persons	are	required	take	enhanced	measures	to	
manage	and	mitigate	the	risks.74	“Politically	exposed	persons”,	correspondent	relationships	
between	 institutions,	 and	 certain	 jurisdictions	 have	 been	 identified	 specifically	 as	 higher	
risk.75	Enhanced	customer	due	diligence	is	required	in	such	cases,	to	manage	and	mitigate	
those	risks	appropriately.			
	
iv. Risky	places		
	
In	2016,	under	Article	9(1)(2)	of	4AMLD,	the	European	Commission	identified	and	published	
a	 list	 of	 “high-risk	 third	 countries”	 with	 strategic	 deficiencies	 in	 their	 national	 AML/CFT	
regimes	that	pose	significant	threats	to	the	financial	system	of	the	EU,	 in	order	to	protect	
the	proper	functioning	of	the	internal	market.76	All	relevant	persons	should	apply	enhanced	
due	diligence	measures	in	their	relationship	to	natural	persons	or	legal	entities	established	
in	these	high-risk	third	countries.	
	
v. Risky	relationships		
	
Correspondent	 relationships	 (i.e.	 the	 provision	 of	 banking	 services	 by	 a	 correspondent	
institution	 to	 a	 respondent;	 or	 the	 relationship	 between	 credit	 institutions	 and	 financial	
institutions77)	 are	 regarded	 as	 high	 risk.78	 For	 this	 reason,	 financial	 and	 credit	 institutions	
engaged	 in	 cross-border	 correspondent	 relationships	 with	 a	 third	 country	 respondent	
institution	 must	 conduct	 enhanced	 due	 diligence.79	 Where	 the	 respondent	 is	 based	 in	
another	 European	 Economic	 Area	 (EEA)	 country,	 EDD	 is	 not	 required,	 unless	 the	
correspondent	relationship	is	considered	high	risk.	
			
vi. Risky	people		
																																																						
71	4AMLD,	Article	15.	
72	Regulation	37.	
73	Money	Laundering	Regulations	2007,	Regulation	13.	
74	4AMLD,	Article	18.	
75	Regulation	33.	
76	Commission	Delegated	Regulation	(EU)	2016/1675	of	14	July	2016	supplementing	Directive	(EU)	2015/849	of	
the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	by	identifying	high-risk	third	countries	with	strategic	deficiencies:	
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2016.254.01.0001.01.ENG.	
77	Regulation	34(4).	
78	FATF,	Correspondent	Banking	Services	(FATF,	2016)	p10.	
79	Regulations	33	and	44.	
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As	was	 the	 case	under	 3AMLD,	 politically	 exposed	persons	 (PEPs)	 are	 viewed	as	 posing	 a	
heightened	risk	of	financial	criminality	or	corruption,	and	so	AML	regulations	impose	more	
onerous	 obligations	 on	 them.	 PEPs	 are	 those	 with	 a	 prominent	 public	 function,	 such	 as	
heads	 of	 State,	 ministers,	 members	 of	 parliament,	 members	 of	 the	 governing	 bodies	 of	
political	 parties;	members	 of	 supreme	 courts,	 courts	 of	 auditors	 or	 the	 boards	 of	 central	
banks;	 ambassadors,	 high-ranking	 officers	 in	 the	 armed	 forces,	 members	 of	 the	
administrative,	management	 or	 supervisory	 bodies	 of	 State-owned	 enterprises;	 directors,	
deputy	 directors	 and	 members	 of	 the	 board	 or	 equivalent	 function	 of	 international	
organisations.80	This	does	not	include	middle-ranking	or	more	junior	officials.	The	rationale	
for	focusing	on	those	at	senior	levels	is	the	perception	that	they	will	have	more	power	and	
assets,	and	are	likely	to	encounter	more	opportunities	for	corruption.	One	could	dispute	this	
by	 noting	 that	 lower	 ranking	 public	 servants	 are	 less	 well	 paid	 and	 this	may	 affect	 their	
motivations.	Of	course,	a	critical	consequence	of	such	a	line	of	argument	is	extension	of	the	
scheme,	 which	 I	 do	 not	 advocate.	 Rather	 I	 highlight	 these	 competing	 arguments	 to	
emphasise	the	contested	underpinnings	of	this	dimension	of	the	AML	scheme.		
	
PEPs	were	first	described	and	targeted	in	2003	by	the	FATF,81	and	distinct	rules	have	been	in	
place	 in	 the	 EU	 since	 2005	 requiring	 “enhanced	 due	 diligence”	 and	 enhanced	 ongoing	
monitoring	when	dealing	with	them,	their	family	members	or	close	associates.	While	these	
duties	 once	 applied	 to	 international	 PEPs	 only,	 4AMLD	 extends	 these	 obligations	 to	
domestic	PEPs,	that	is,	a	politically	exposed	person	who	is	or	who	has	been	entrusted	with	
prominent	 public	 functions	 by	 any	 Member	 State	 or	 by	 an	 institution	 of	 the	 European	
Union.82	 Even	 after	 a	 PEP	 ceases	 to	 be	 entrusted	with	 a	 prominent	 public	 function,	 EDD	
must	be	carried	out	for	at	least	12	months.83	However,	firms	are	no	longer	required	to	apply	
EDD	in	relation	to	the	family	members	or	known	close	associates	of	a	former	PEP.	
	
The	extension	to	domestic	PEPs	is	logical	in	so	far	as	it	is	more	consistent	and	arguably	more	
fair.	Moreover,	 the	multinational	nature	of	many	 institutions	as	well	 as	 clients/customers	
means	 that	distinguishing	between	domestic	 and	non-domestic	 PEPs	 is	 not	practicable	or	
useful.	 Then	 again,	 this	 is	 still	 further	 evidence	 of	 the	 creeping	 expansion	 of	 AML.	 To	
mitigate	 this	 development,	 HM	 Treasury	 advocates	 a	 moderate	 approach	 in	 terms	 of	
application,	citing	the	UK’s	position	as	a	world	leader	in	the	fight	against	corruption,	money	
laundering	and	terrorist	financing,	 its	strong	and	stable	democratic	 institutions,	free	press,	
independent	 judiciary	 and	 free	 and	 fair	 elections,	 indicating	 that	 “PEPs	 entrusted	 with	
prominent	public	functions	by	the	UK	should	generally	be	treated	as	lower-risk”.84	
	
The	 level	 of	 risk	 posed	 by	 PEPs	 varies	 substantially	 from	 case	 to	 case,	 and	 so	 a	 uniform	
approach	is	not	appropriate	nor	required.	There	is	no	automatic	refusal	of	banking	or	other	
services	on	the	basis	 that	a	person	 is	a	PEP	or	a	 family	member	of	associate.	As	 the	FATF	
asserts,	 “these	 requirements	 are	 preventive	 (not	 criminal)	 in	 nature,	 and	 should	 not	 be	
																																																						
80	Regulation	35(14).	
81	See	FATF,	FATF	40	Recommendations	(2003),	Recommendation	6	http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20-%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf		
82	4AMLD,	Article	9a.	
83	4AMLD,	Article	22.	
84	HM	Treasury,	Consultation,	8.	
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interpreted	as	stigmatising	PEPs	as	such	being	involved	in	criminal	activity”.85 Nonetheless,	
these	provisions	can	have	problematic	consequences,	as	overzealous	use	by	certain	financial	
institutions	will	have	a	disproportionate	effect	on	PEPs,	family	and	associates.	
	
vii. “De-risking”	–	and	ignoring	risk		
	
Difficulties	 arise	 because	 of	 the	 imposition	 of	 onerous	 reporting	 and	 monitoring	
requirements	 on	 the	 private	 sector,	 and	 nothing	 in	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 addresses	 this	
adequately.	One	obvious	“workaround”,	to	minimise	compliance	cost	and	effort,	is	through	
the	 process	 of	what	 is	 called	 “de-risking”	whereby	 entities	 terminate	 or	 restrict	 business	
relationships	 with	 categories	 of	 clients	 to	 avoid,	 rather	 than	 manage,	 risk.86	 This	 is	
something	of	a	misnomer,	as	this	is	risk	avoidance,	essentially.	Though	understandable	from	
a	business	perspective,	this	runs	counter	to	the	aim	and	purpose	of	the	risk-based	approach	
advocated	 by	 the	 FATF	 and	 embedded	 across	 the	 EU.	 Undeniably,	 these	 are	 commercial	
decisions	 based	 on	 the	 “risk	 appetite”	 of	 banks,	 and	 so	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 regulatory	
intervention	 is	 feasible	or	desirable	 is	open	 to	discussion.	Nonetheless,	de-risking	 impacts	
on	particular	sectors,	countries	and	people	particularly,87	such	as	money	service	businesses,	
and	 correspondent	 banks,	 PEPs	 and	 migrant	 populations	 seeking	 to	 send	 remittance	
payments.			
	
For	 instance,	 in	2013,	Barclays	 terminated	 the	accounts	of	over	140	UK-based	 remittance	
companies,	 including	Dahabshiil	 Transfer	 Services	 Ltd,	 the	 largest	African	Money	 Transfer	
Operator.	 Dahabshiil	 successfully	 sought	 an	 interim	 injunction,	 based	 on	 the	 claim	 that	
where	 allegations	 of	 abuse	 of	 a	 dominant	 position	 had	 been	 brought	 against	 a	 bank	
following	its	decision	to	partially	withdraw	from	the	money	service	business	sector,88	there	
was	a	triable	issue	as	to	whether	it	held	a	dominant	position	in	that	market.	This	matter	was	
resolved	ultimately	out	of	court.89	
		
The	effects	of	de-risking	in	relation	to	PEPs	was	sought	to	be	mitigated	by	section	333U	of	
the	 Financial	 Services	 and	 Markets	 Act	 2000	 (as	 inserted	 by	 section	 30	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	
England	 and	 Financial	 Services	 Act	 2016),	which	 requires	 the	 Financial	 Conduct	 Authority	
(FCA)	 to	 produce	 guidance	 to	 ensure	 a	 “proportional,	 risk-based	 and	 differentiated	
approach	 to	 conducting	 transactions	or	business	 relationships”	with	PEPs.	 Though	 section	
333U	has	yet	to	be	commenced,	regulation	48(1)	of	the	MLR	2017	also	requires	the	FCA	to	
																																																						
85	FATF,	FATF	Guidance,	politically	exposed	persons	(recommendations	12	and	22)	2013:	www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-PEP-Rec12-22.pdf	p3.	    	
86	See	Financial	Conduct	Authority,	“FCA	Research	into	the	issue	of	de-risking”	24/5/17:	
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/fca-research-issue-de-risking	and	FATF,	“FATF	clarifies	risk-based	
approach:	case-by-case,	not	wholesale	de-risking”	(23/10/2014):	http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/rba-and-de-risking.html	See	T	Boyce	“De-risking,	pre-risking	and	
re-risking	of	correspondent	banking	relationships”	[2016]	Journal	of	International	Banking	Law	and	Regulation	
305.		
87	World	Bank,	Fact	finding	summary	from	de-risking	surveys	(World	Bank	Group,	2015):	
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/534371468197058296/Fact-finding-summary-from-de-risking-
surveys;	Center	for	Global	Development,	Unintended	Consequences	of	Anti–Money	Laundering	Policies	for	
Poor	Countries	(CGD	Working	Group:	2015).		
88	Dahabshiil	Transfer	Services	Ltd	v	Barclays	Bank	Plc	Harada	Ltd	v	Barclays	Bank	Plc	[2013]	EWHC	3379	(Ch);	
[2014]	U.K.C.L.R.	215.	
89	M.	Arnold,	“Barclays	and	remittance	group	reach	deal	on	Somalia	services”,	Financial	Times,	16	April	2014.	
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issue	 such	 guidance.	 	 The	 FCA’s	 Guidance,	 issued	 in	 July	 2017,	 states	 that	 a	 PEP	 who	 is	
entrusted	with	a	prominent	public	function	in	the	UK	should	be	treated	as	low	risk,	unless	a	
firm	has	assessed	that	other	risk	factors	not	linked	to	their	position	as	a	PEP	mean	they	pose	
a	 higher	 risk.90	 Furthermore,	 the	 Financial	 Ombudsman	 Service	 (FOS)	 can	 consider	
complaints	 from	 PEPs	 against	 financial	 institutions,91	 though	 banks	 cannot	 be	 forced	 to	
provide	a	service	to	a	customer	deemed	to	be	inappropriate.		
	
As	well	as	wholesale	de-risking,	there	is	evidence	that	banks	fail	to	take	account	of	the	risks	
posed	by	PEPs.	The	FCA	carried	out	a	study	of	27	banking	groups,	representative	of	banks	
dealing	 with	 higher	 risk	 customers	 and	 products,	 and	 found	 that	 a	 third	 of	 these	 would	
assume	 very	 high	 levels	 of	 money	 laundering	 risk	 if	 the	 immediate	 reputational	 and	
regulatory	 risk	 was	 acceptable.92 They	 were	 unwilling	 to	 refuse	 or	 exit	 very	 profitable	
business	 relationships	 even	 where	 there	 was	 what	 was	 called	 an	 “unacceptable”	 risk	 of	
handling	the	proceeds	of	crime.	Moreover,	Barclays	was	fined	£72m	in	2015	for	applying	a	
lower	level	of	due	diligence	than	its	own	policies	required	to	clients	who	were	PEPs	and	so	
should	have	been	subject	to	enhanced	levels	of	due	diligence	and	monitoring.93	Barclays	did	
not	 wish	 to	 inconvenience	 the	 clients.	 These	 examples	 underline	 the	 irregularities	 and	
inconsistency	in	the	application	of	the	risk-based	approach.			
	
viii. Concluding	remarks			
	
As	noted,	the	implementation	of	an	ostensibly	risk-based	approach	is	distorted	by	business	
imperatives,	 an	 inevitability	 when	 the	 “police”	 are	 profit-making	 entities.	 The	 FCA	 found	
banks’	 compliance	with	 the	2007	 regulations	 to	be	patchy,	 and	 in	 some	 instances	poor;94	
there	 is	 little	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 will	 be	 applied	 more	 uniformly	 or	
appropriately.	Regardless,	the	evangelical	nature	of	the	risk	discourse	is	exemplified	in	the	
exhortation	of	the	JMLSG	for	the	risk-based	approach	to	be	embedded	“as	part	of	the	firm’s	
philosophy”.95	More	pragmatically,	the	JMLSG	concedes	that	while	no	system	of	checks	will	
detect	 and	 prevent	 all	 money	 laundering,	 this	 approach	 balances	 the	 cost	 burden	 on	
individual	 firms	and	 customers	with	a	 realistic	 assessment	of	 the	 threat	of	 the	 firm	being	
used	 in	connection	with	money	 laundering.96	Though	 the	objectives	behind	 this	gradation	
are	 understandable,	 I	 take	 issue	 with	 its	 extent,	 irregularities,	 and	 questionable	 efficacy.	
While	Unger	and	van	Waarden	suggest	that	a	risk-based	approach	may	not	be	sustainable,	
																																																						
90	Financial	Conduct	Authority,	The	treatment	of	politically	exposed	persons	for	anti-money	laundering	
purposes	(para	2.29)	https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/finalised-guidance/fg17-06.pdf		
91	Schedule	7,	Part	1	of	the	2017	Regulations	makes	the	requisite	amendments	to	the	Financial	Services	and	
Markets	Act	2000.	
92	 Financial	 Services	 Authority,	Banks’	 Management	 of	 High	 Money-Laundering	 Risk	 Situations	 (Financial	
Services	Authority	2011),	p4:	http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/fsa-aml-final-report.		
93	Financial	Services	Authority	Press	Release,	“FCA	fines	Barclays	£72	million	for	poor	handling	of	financial	
crime	risks”,	26/11/2015:	https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-fines-barclays-£72-million-poor-
handling-financial-crime-risks							
94	 Financial	 Services	 Authority,	Banks’	 Management	 of	 High	 Money-Laundering	 Risk	 Situations	 (Financial	
Services	Authority	2011),	p4:	http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/fsa-aml-final-report.		
95	JMLSG,	Guidance,	4.27.	
96	JMLSG,	Guidance,	4.27.	
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as	 litigation	eventually	may	 result	 in	 its	 replacement	by	a	 rule-based	approach,97	 the	 risk-
based	approach	is	secure,	for	now.	
	
	
b. Transparency		
	
As	well	as	an	augmented	scheme	for	assessing	and	reporting	risk,	the	other	central	theme	
to	 4AMLD	 and	 the	 2017	 Regulations	 is	 transparency.	 In	 a	 radical	 and	 noteworthy	
development,	4AMLD	requires	“beneficial	ownership”	registers	to	be	established	for	certain	
corporates	and	trusts.	Transparency	is	to	the	fore	increasingly	in	the	global	political	setting,	
and	 there	 is	 growing	 focus	 on	 the	 misuse	 of	 different	 legal	 entities	 and	 their	 ability	 to	
conceal	the	identity	of	the	ultimate,	potentially	criminal,	beneficiaries	of	property.98	These	
concerns	 were	 given	 added	 impetus	 by	 the	 revelations	 in	 the	 “Panama	 papers”	 in	 April	
2016,	 followed	 closely	 by	 the	 commitments	 about	 the	 disclosure	 of	 beneficial	 ownership	
made	 at	 the	 Anti-Corruption	 Summit	 in	 London,	 May	 2016.99	 This	 view	 is	 shared	 in	 an	
operational	 sense	 domestically,	 with	 the	 National	 Crime	 Agency	 stating	 that	 “high	 end	
money	 laundering”	 relies	 on	 structures	 set	 up	 specifically	 with	 obscured	 beneficial	
ownership,	in	order	to	hide	the	nature	and	ownership	of	the	funds.100		
	
The	crux	of	the	 issue	here	 is	the	 inherent	capacity	of	different	 legal	structures	to	hide	the	
true	 or	 ultimate	 “beneficial	 owner”	 of	 property	 that	 is	 implicated	 in	 or	 the	 proceeds	 of	
criminality.	 The	 term	 “beneficial	 owner”	 now	 is	 deployed	 more	 broadly	 than	 its	 original	
usage	in	trust	law,	to	denote	the	person	who	will	benefit	from	or	can	use	particular	assets.	
Though	 issues	 of	 definition	 and	 scope	 of	 “beneficial	 owner”	 arise,101	 4AMLD	 describes	
“beneficial	owner”	as	“the	natural	person(s)	who	ultimately	owns	or	controls	the	customer	
and/or	the	natural	person	on	whose	behalf	a	transaction	or	activity	is	being	conducted”,	or	
as	 the	 natural	 person(s)	 who	 ultimately	 owns	 or	 controls	 25%	 of	 legal	 entity,	 or	 the	
beneficiary	of	 25%	or	more	of	 the	property	of	 a	 legal	 arrangement	or	entity.102	 “5AMLD”	
may	 lower	 this	 to	 10%	 for	 certain	 entities	which	 present	 a	 specific	 risk	 of	 being	 used	 for	
money	laundering	and	tax	evasion.103	
																																																						
97	Unger	and	van	Waarden,	“How	to	Dodge	Drowning	in	Data?”.	
98	See	T.M.C.	Asser	Institut,	Prevention	of	organised	crime:	The	registration	of	legal	persons	and	their	directors	
and	the	international	exchange	of	information,	commissioned	by	the	European	Commission,	1	March	2000,	p.	
11;	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Behind	the	Corporate	Veil:	Using	Corporate	
Entities	for	Illicit	Purposes	(OECD	2001),	p3;	G8,	Action	Plan:	Principles	To	Prevent	the	Misuse	Of	Companies	
and	Legal	Arrangements	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-
the-misuse-of-companies-and-legal-arrangements;	
https://www.ag.gov.au/CrimeAndCorruption/AntiCorruption/Documents/G20High-
LevelPrinciplesOnBeneficialOwnershipTransparency.pdf		
99	L.	Campbell,	“The	organisation	of	corruption	in	commercial	enterprise:	Concealing	(and	revealing)	the	
beneficial	ownership	of	assets”	in	Corruption	in	Commercial	Enterprise:	Law,	Theory	and	Practice	in	L.	
Campbell	&	N.	Lord	(ed)	(Routledge,	forthcoming	2018).	
100	National	Crime	Agency	National	Strategic	Assessment	of	Serious	and	Organised	Crime	2016	(National	Crime	
Agency,	2016)	[90],	[93].	
101	FATF,	Money	Laundering	Using	Trust	and	Company	Service	Providers	(FATF,	2010)	Pt	86(v).	
102	Article	3(6).	
103	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	amending	
Directive	(EU)	2015/849	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purposes	of	money	
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i. Register	of	corporates		
	
Though	 the	 trend	 towards	 greater	 transparency	was	 already	manifest	 in	 the	UK	with	 the	
introduction	of	 the	“register	of	people	with	significant	control”	 in	2015,	 the	EU	provisions	
are	broader	 in	 application	and	 scope.	Article	30	of	 4AMLD	 requires	 EU	member	 states	 to	
hold	adequate,	accurate	and	current	information	on	the	beneficial	ownership	of	corporate	
and	other	legal	entities	incorporated	within	their	territory	in	a	central	register	and	provides	
that	 such	 information	 should	 be	made	 available	 to	 specific	 authorities,	 organisations	 and	
those	with	a	legitimate	interest	across	the	EU.	“5AMLD”	proposes	to	require	Member	States	
to	put	in	place	mechanisms	to	ensure	the	information	in	the	register	is	verified	on	a	regular	
basis.104			
	
4AMLD	 provides	 for	 an	 exemption	 from	 access	 to	 all	 or	 part	 of	 the	 information	 on	 the	
beneficial	 ownership	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 in	 exceptional	 circumstances,	 where	 such	
access	 would	 expose	 the	 beneficial	 owner	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 fraud,	 kidnapping,	 blackmail,	
violence	or	intimidation,	or	where	the	beneficial	owner	is	a	minor	or	otherwise	incapable.105	
Further	elaboration	on	this	is	likely	in	“5AMLD”.		
	
As	 noted,	 an	 equivalent	 scheme	 has	 already	 been	 introduced	 in	 the	UK	 by	means	 of	 the	
register	 of	 people	 with	 significant	 control	 (“PSC	 register”)	 through	 the	 Small	 Business,	
Enterprise	and	Employment	Act	2015.	Under	section	81	as	enacted,	UK	companies,	limited	
liability	 partnerships	 and	 societates	 europaeae	must	maintain	 a	 PSC	 register	 and	 provide	
this	 to	 Companies	 House	 annually.	 This	 is	 a	 central,	 searchable	 and	 annually	 updated	
register,	which	can	be	used	to	determine	who	controls	certain	entities	in	the	UK.	“Significant	
control”	(as	defined	in	the	rather	complex	Schedule	1A	of	the	Companies	Act	2006)	includes	
holding	directly	or	indirectly	more	than	25%	of	company’s	shares	or	voting	rights,	or	having	
the	right	to	appoint	or	remove	a	majority	of	the	directors.	It	also	includes	an	individual	who	
exercises	significant	influence	or	control	over	a	trust	or	firm	which	does	not	have	separate	
legal	 personality	 and	 has	 significant	 influence	 or	 control	 over	 the	 company.	 The	
consequences	of	non-compliance	with	this	provision	are	not	insignificant,	 in	that	failure	to	
provide	accurate	information	on	a	PSC	register	or	to	comply	with	notices	requiring	PSCs	to	
provide	information	is	a	criminal	offence	for	both	the	company	and	its	officers,	punishable	
by	up	 to	 two	years	 imprisonment.106	The	majority	of	companies	and	LLPs	need	 to	comply	
with	 the	 provisions	 or	 risk	 being	 convicted	 of	 a	 criminal	 offence	 (listed	 companies	 are	
broadly	 exempt	 as	 they	 are	 already	 subject	 to	 transparency	 obligations	 under	 the	 FCA’s	
Disclosure	and	Transparency	Rules107).	There	is	no	statutory	defence	available	to	a	company	
for	breach	of	the	provisions.		
	
																																																																																																																																																																								
laundering	or	terrorist	financing	and	amending	Directive	2009/101/EC,	COM(2016)	450	final	2016/0208	(COD),	
5	July	2016.	
104	European	Commission,	Proposal	for	a	Directive	of	the	European	Parliament	and	of	the	Council	amending	
Directive	(EU)	2015/849	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purposes	of	money	
laundering	or	terrorist	financing	and	amending	Directive	2009/101/EC,	COM(2016)	450	final	2016/0208	(COD),	
5	July	2016.	
105	Article	30(9).	
106	Companies	Act	2006,	s.790F.	
107	https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/DTR.pdf		
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The	requirement	of	annual	updating	under	the	2015	Act	was	not	sufficient	to	meet	4AMLD’s	
requirement	 for	 information	 to	 be	 “current”,	 and	 so	 a	 requirement	 to	 notify	 changes	 in	
beneficial	 ownership	within	 a	 shorter	 time	 frame	was	 introduced,	 under	 the	 Information	
about	People	with	Significant	Control	(Amendment)	Regulations	2017.	Entities	must	record	
changes	 to	 information	 on	 their	 PSC	 register	within	 14	 days	 of	 obtaining	 the	 information	
and	file	that	information	with	the	registrar	within	a	further	14	days.108	Also,	a	modified	form	
of	the	regime	now	applies	to	Scottish	limited	partnerships.109	Despite	these	recent	changes,	
there	is	no	exemption	on	the	grounds	of	possible	danger	to	the	beneficial	owner.		
	
ii. Register	of	trusts	
	
Similarly,	 Article	 31	 of	 4AMLD	 requires	 the	 trustees	 of	 any	 express	 trust	 with	 tax	
consequences110	 to	hold	adequate,	 accurate	and	up-to-date	 information	on	 the	beneficial	
ownership	 of	 the	 trust.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 aforementioned	 companies’	 beneficial	 owner	
register,	the	information	is	not	publically	available	but	can	be	accessed	by	law	enforcement	
and	 the	 UK	 Financial	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (UKFIU).111	 HMRC	 plans	 to	 launch	 its	 register	 in	
summer	2017	as	an	online	service.112		
	
Trusts	 have	major	 advantages	 over	 other	 structures	 in	 terms	 of	 profit	 maximisation	 and	
capital	mobility.113	 The	 perception	 is	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 legitimate	 personal	 and	 financial	
planning	 purposes,	 trusts	 can	 be	 employed	 for	 illicit	 ends,	 due	 to	 their	 autonomous	 and	
relatively	unregulated	nature,	 and	 their	 ability	and	purpose	 to	 conceal	 the	 identity	of	 the	
beneficiaries.114		That	said,	empirical	evidence	is	lacking	as	to	their	use	in	money	laundering,	
though	 this	 may	 be	 an	 inevitable	 consequence	 of	 their	 secretive	 nature.	 A	 World	 Bank	
review	of	150	grand	corruption	 investigations	 found	that	trusts	were	used	 infrequently,115	
comprising	five	percent	of	the	corporate	vehicles	identified	and	appearing	in	c.15	percent	of	
the	investigations,	mostly	in	Latin	America,	the	Caribbean,	and	high-income	nations.	These	
findings	 may	 challenge	 widespread	 presumption	 about	 misuse	 of	 trusts.	 It	 is	 unclear	
whether	 this	 pattern	 would	 be	 replicated	 in	 the	 UK,	 and	 whether	 there	 is	 a	 connection	
between	 the	scale	of	 the	corruption	and	 the	 trust	used.	 	Moreover,	one	must	be	mindful	
that	 the	 cases	 explored	 in	 the	 World	 Bank	 review	 may	 not	 be	 representative,	 as	 they	
comprise	cases	under	 investigation;	 in	other	words,	 the	“successful”	misuse	of	 trusts	may	
never	come	to	light.	It	is	this	phenomenon	that	the	register	seeks	to	address.	
	
iii. Registering	concern		
																																																						
108	Information	about	People	with	Significant	Control	(Amendment)	Regulations	2017,	Regulations	7	&8.	
109	The	Scottish	Partnerships	(Register	of	People	with	Significant	Control)	Regulations	2017.	
110	HM	Treasury	sates	that	“The	term	“express	trust”	should	be	taken	to	mean	a	trust	that	was	deliberately	
created	by	a	settlor	expressly	transferring	property	to	a	trustee	for	a	valid	purpose,	as	opposed	to	a	statutory,	
resulting	or	constructive	trust.”	HM	Treasury,	Consultation,	9.2.		
111	Regulation	45.	
112	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/hm-revenue-and-customs-trusts-and-estates-
newsletters/hmrc-trusts-and-estates-newsletter-april-2017		
113	B.	Harrington,	“Trusts	and	financialization”	(2017)	15	Socio-economic	Review	31-63.	
114	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	Behind	the	Corporate	Veil:	Using	Corporate	
Entities	for	Illicit	Purposes	(OECD	2001),	25.	
115	E.	van	der	Does	et	al.,	The	Puppet	Masters,	How	the	Corrupt	Use	Legal	Structures	to	Hide	Stolen	Assets	and	
What	to	Do	About	It	(World	Bank	/	UNODC	StAR	2011)	3.2.2.	
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While	 the	 sentiment	 behind	 these	 beneficial	 ownership	 initiatives	 is	 understandable,	 I	
suggest	 that	 both	 in	 doctrine	 and	 implementation	 they	 are	 questionable.	 The	 threshold,	
whether	of	25%	or	10%,	is	arbitrary	and	can	be	circumvented.	When	AMLD3	was	agreed,	a	
25%	baseline	was	deemed	to	be	sufficient,	following	the	example	in	the	FATF	Guidance	on	
Transparency	 and	 Beneficial	 Ownership	 (which,	 however,	 was	 careful	 to	 note	 that	 its	
Recommendations	 do	 not	 specify	 an	 appropriate	 threshold116).	 Article	 43	 of	 3AMLD	
required	the	Commission	to	present	a	report	to	the	European	Parliament	and	the	Council	on	
the	“possible	expediency	and	consequences	of	a	reduction	…	from	25%	to	20%”.117	Though	
the	Commission	contemplated	whether	such	modification	was	appropriate,	it	has	not	been	
changed	in	4AMLD,	and	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	“5AMLD”	alters	it.	In	any	event,	this	
(or	any)	threshold	can	be	circumvented	by	dividing	the	ownership	into	smaller	elements	by	
those	who	seek	to	hide	ownership	and	control.	Second,	the	scheme	hinges	to	a	large	extent	
on	self-reporting.	Maintenance	and	monitoring	is	likely	to	be	onerous	for	Companies	House,	
and	unless	resource	is	increased,	this	scheme	is	not	likely	to	achieve	its	aim.	
	
Overall,	 the	value	of	such	registries	 is	partial.	As	was	noted	 in	the	World	Bank	study,	they	
“are	almost	invariably	archival	in	nature;	they	rarely	conduct	independent	verification;	and	
in	many	cases,	they	are	already	stretched	for	resources”.118	They	present	a	static	outline	of	
information	that	is	likely	to	be	partial	and	could	possibly	be	false.	Crucially,	ascertaining	the	
accuracy	 of	 the	 data	 contained	 within	 them	 is	 very	 difficult,	 though	 the	 UK	 government	
asserts	that	inaccurate	or	fraudulent	information	will	be	detected	by	virtue	of	the	openness	
and	frequency	of	access	of	the	registers.119	This	is	an	optimistic	claim,	and	a	curious,	if	not	
unfamiliar,	displacement	of	responsibility	for	validating	a	state	repository.	Nonetheless	the	
very	presence	of	registries	may	deter	or	at	least	displace	criminality.	Moreover,	they	are	a	
useful	starting	point	in	identifying,	monitoring	and	addressing	criminal	behaviour,	and	may	
indicate	connections	or	 jurisdictions	that	prove	fruitful	 in	 investigations.	All	that	said,	they	
will	need	to	be	complemented	and	corroborated	by	other	sources	of	data.	
	
c. Objections	to	the	MLR	2017		
	
There	 is	 political	 unanimity	 as	 to	 the	 need	 to	 address	 money	 laundering	 robustly,	 in	
preventive	 and	 reactive	 modes.	 As	 Halliday	 et	 al.	 note,	 the	 orthodoxy	 is	 that	 the	
implementation	 of	 an	 effective	 AML	 regime	 delivers	 only	 public	 and	 private	 goods	 and	
imposes	 no	 “bads.”120	 Despite	 this,	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 system	 have	 not	 been	
demonstrated.121	Now	I	outline	some	critical	objections,	both	principled	and	pragmatic,	to	
current	AML	laws	and	policies	in	the	UK,	centring	on	1.	effectiveness,	2.	human	rights,	and	
3.	unintended	consequences.		
	
																																																						
116	FATF,	Guidance	on	Transparency	and	Beneficial	Ownership	2014,	p15.	
117	See	European	Commission,	Report	from	The	Commission	to	The	European	Parliament	and	The	Council	on	
the	application	of	Directive	2005/60/EC	on	the	prevention	of	the	use	of	the	financial	system	for	the	purpose	of	
money	laundering	and	terrorist	financing	(European	Commission,	2012).	
118	E.	van	der	Does	et	al.,	The	Puppet	Masters,	p5.	
119	HM	Treasury,	Consultation.	
120	T.	Halliday,	M.	Levi,	and	P.	Reuter,	Global	Surveillance	of	Dirty	Money:	Assessing	Assessments	of	Regimes	to	
Control	Money-Laundering	and	Combat	the	Financing	of	Terrorism	(American	Bar	Foundation,	2014)	p47	[105].		
121	Halliday	et	al.	p47	[104].	
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First,	 there	was	 limited	empirical	evidence	of	 the	effectiveness	of	 the	previous	scheme,122	
undermining	 any	 claims	 that	 its	 extension	 through	 4MLD	 and	 the	 MLR	 2017	 would	 be	
beneficial.	 As	Mike	 Levi	 and	 Peter	 Reuter	 noted	 in	 2006	 the	 effects	 of	 “the	 increasingly	
global,	intrusive,	and	routinized	set	of	measures	to	affect	criminal	revenues	passing	through	
the	financial	system”	“[e]xcept	at	an	anecdotal	level…	are	“unknown”,	and	“[a]vailable	data	
weakly	suggest	that	the	anti-money	 laundering	(AML)	regime	has	not	had	major	effects	 in	
suppressing	 crimes”.123	 While	 they	 note	 that	 the	 regime	 eases	 the	 investigation	 and	
prosecution	of	some	criminal	participants	who	would	otherwise	evade	justice,	this	is	fewer	
than	 expected,	 and	 the	 recovery	 of	 funds	 “is	 very	 slight	 compared	 with	 income	 or	 even	
profits	from	crime”.124	To	this	I	would	add,	very	slight	when	compared	to	the	overall	costs	of	
compliance.125				
	
Second,	elements	of	the	MLR	2017	have	significant	 implications	for	human	rights,	not	 just	
those	 of	 “bad	 guys”,126	 which	 it	 what	 may	 make	 these	 schemes	 palatable	 or	 appealing.	
Registers	of	personal	data	engage	and	potentially	breach	the	right	to	privacy,	as	protected	
by	Article	8	of	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights.	This	is	especially	pronounced	in	
relation	to	publically	accessible	registers.		In	relation	to	trusts	and	the	right	to	privacy,	it	is	
instructive	 to	consider	 the	 jurisprudence	of	 the	French	courts	 considering	 the	public	 trust	
register	 there.	A	register	was	created	 in	France	 in	2013	requiring	disclosure	to	 the	French	
tax	authorities	of	 full	details	of	any	trusts	with	a	French	resident	settlor	or	beneficiary,	or	
which	have	assets	in	France.	This	register	was	made	public	online	in	July	2016,	leading	to	a	
legal	challenge	from	an	American	citizen,	who	is	resident	in	France	and	a	beneficiary	of	one	
of	the	publicised	trusts.	Later	that	month,	the	Conseil	d’Etat,	France’s	highest	administrative	
court,	provisionally	suspended	the	register	with	immediate	effect,	and	in	October	2016	the	
Conseil	Constitutionnel	ruled	that	inclusion	in	a	publicly	accessible	register	of	the	names	of	
the	 settlor,	beneficiary	and	administrator	of	a	 trust	which	provides	 information	on	how	a	
person	 intends	 to	 dispose	 of	 his	 or	 her	 estate	 is	 a	 “manifestly	 disproportionate”	
encroachment	 on	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 private	 life.127	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	 relevant	
paragraph	 of	 the	 Tax	 Code	 being	 declared	 unconstitutional.128	 It	 appears	 that	 the	
determination	 hinged	 on	 the	 “public”	 aspect	 of	 the	 register	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 the	
information.	Nonetheless,	this	decision	underlines	the	contentious	nature	of	such	measures,	
and	 suggests	 potential	 challenges	 on	 human	 rights	 grounds	 to	 the	 EU’s	 requirement	 of	
public	registers	of	trusts.	All	that	said,	it	is	unlikely	that	any	comparable	challenge	could	be	
raised	 to	 the	 UK’s	 PSC	 register,	 even	 in	 its	 amended	 form,	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 this	 is	 a	
proportionate	response	to	a	legitimate	aim.		
	
The	Commission	is	proposing	even	more	open,	public	access	to	the	registries	under	5AMLD;	
this	 is	 likely	 to	be	 incompatible	with	EU	data	protection	 laws.	 Indeed,	 the	European	Data	
Protection	 Supervisor	 (EDPS)	has	 expressed	 concern	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 amendments	
																																																						
122	M.	Levi	and	P.	Reuter,	“Money	Laundering”	(2006)	34	Crime	and	Justice	289,	294.	
123	Ibid.	
124	ibid.	
125	Also	see	J.	Harvey,	“Just	how	effective	is	money	laundering	legislation?”	(2008)	21	Security	Journal	189.	
126	R.	Ivory,	Corruption,	asset	recovery,	and	the	protection	of	property	in	public	international	law:	the	human	
rights	of	bad	guys	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).		
127	Décision	n°	2016-591	QPC	du	21	Octobre	2016.	
128	Second	paragraph	of	Article	1649	AB	of	the	General	Tax	Code.	
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introduce	 policy	 purposes	 other	 than	 countering	 anti-money	 laundering	 and	 terrorism	
financing	that	do	not	seem	clearly	identified	and	so	breach	the	data	protection	principle	of	
purpose	 limitation.129	 The	 EDPS	 also	 states	 that	 the	 amendments	 are	 disproportionate	 in	
departing	 from	 the	 risk-based	 approach	 and	 remove	 existing	 safeguards	 that	would	 have	
granted	a	certain	degree	of	proportionality,	for	example,	in	setting	the	conditions	for	access	
to	information	on	financial	transactions	by	Financial	Intelligence	Units	and	limiting	access	to	
beneficial	ownership	information	by	both	competent	authorities	and	the	public.	
	
Third,	 the	scheme	of	AML	has	a	number	of	unintended	consequences.	As	outlined	above,	
the	 risk-based	 approach	 has	 prompted	 a	 backlash	 which	 impacts	 detrimentally	 on	 the	
provision	 of	 services	 to	 certain	 communities,	 individuals,	 and	 sectors.	 Furthermore,	 as	
Halliday	et	al.	remind	us,	AML	is	open	to	misuse	by	authoritarian	rulers.130	Moreover,	AML	
overlooks	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 the	 human	 dimension	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 like	 any	scheme	
of	regulation,	 it	 can	 be	 circumvented	 by	insiders.	 It	 is	 easiest	 to	 launder	money	with	 the	
help	 of	 a	 coerced	 or	 bribed	 employee	 in	 a	 financial	 institution,131	 and	 the	 current	
Regulations	may	make	this	a	preferable	option	for	those	with	money	to	“clean”.	
	
	
4. Conclusion	
	
Peter	 Alldridge	 described	 AML	 as	 strongly	 expansionist	 in	 three	 important	 respects:	
geographically,	 by	 area	 of	 the	 economy,	 and	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 legal	 impediments	 to	
effective	 regulation.132	Though	4AMLD	purports	 to	be	more	nuanced	and	ostensibly	more	
sensitive	to	risk	and	new	technologies,	it	maintains	the	growth	of	AML	for	dubious	purposes	
and	unsustainable	 reasons,	and	 this	will	 continue	with	 the	changes	mooted	 in	5AMLD.	As	
has	 been	 explored	 in	 this	 article,	 the	 animating	 principles	 of	 risk-management	 and	
transparency	are	defensible	and	understandable.	The	problems,	rather,	lie	in	the	realisation	
and	governance	of	these	concepts,	the	questionable	efficacy	of	4AMLD	and	the	MLR	2017,	
their	impact	on	human	rights,	and	unarticulated	likely	side	effects.			
	
Ultimately	there	appears	to	be	a	“core	contradiction”	between	a	dominant	economic	policy	
that	seeks	to	liberalise	financial	flows	and	a	crime	control	policy	seeking	to	hamper	them.133	
Such	tension	between	market	freedom	and	regulation	seems	unavoidable	and	intractable	in	
relation	to	AML.	Following	Doreen	McBarnet,	 I	question	the	degree	to	which	AML	“in	 the	
books”	 translates	 into	 the	 compromising	 of	 financial	 flows	 “in	 action”.134	 McBarnet	
identified	a	paradox	in	the	law,	in	relation	to	the	gap	between	its	principle	and	practice:	she	
argued	that	the	gap	exists	within	the	law	and	legal	authority	itself,	rather	than	arising	as	a	
result	of	 its	application.	 I	extend	 this	 insight	 to	 the	current	AML	scheme,	which	 I	argue	 is	
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internally	 inconsistent,	and	fails	to	 incorporate	 its	own	aims	and	principles.	The	risk-based	
approach	 pays	 lip	 service	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 crime	 control,	 while	 simultaneously	 creating	
exceptions	 and	 undermining	 its	 own	 substance.	 And	 the	 crux	 of	 this	 problem	 and	 of	 its	
resolution	 lies	 in	 the	pivotal	 role	of	 the	private	 sector,	 in	 the	divesting	of	duties	 to	 those	
very	institutions	that	are	both	responsible	for	and	subject	to	the	Regulations.							
	
		
	
	
